Reforming Public Financial Management in Africa by Peterson, Stephen Bovard
 
Reforming Public Financial Management in Africa
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Peterson, Stephen. 2010. Reforming Public Financial Management
in Africa. HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP10-
048, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Published Version http://web.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.as
px?PubId=7510
Accessed February 19, 2015 7:36:47 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4669673
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions











Reforming Public Financial 
Management in Africa 
Faculty Research Working Paper Series 
 
 
Stephen Peterson  













The views expressed in the HKS Faculty Research Working Paper 
Series are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of 
the John F. Kennedy School of Government or of Harvard University.  
Faculty Research Working Papers have not undergone formal review and 
approval.  Such papers are included in this series to elicit feedback and 
to encourage debate on important public policy challenges. Copyright 




   1 









Successful public sector reform is rare in Africa. Over twelve years, Ethiopia 
transformed its public financial management (PFM) to international standards and now 
has the third best system in Africa that is managing the largest aid flows to the 
continent. This article presents a framework for understanding PFM reform based on 
the Ethiopian experience. Reforms succeed when they are aligned with the four drivers 
of public sector reform: COPS—context, ownership, purpose and strategy. Public 
financial management is a core function of the state and its sovereignty and it is not an 
appropriate arena for foreign aid intervention—governments must fully own it, which 
was a key to the success of Ethiopia’s reform. The purpose of PFM reform should be 
building stable and sustainable ‘plateaus’ of PFM that are appropriate to the local 
context and they should not be about risky and irrelevant ‘summits’ of international best 
practice. Plateaus not summits are needed in Africa. Finally, a strategy of reform has 
four processes: recognize, improve, change, and sustain. Ethiopia succeeded because it 
implemented a recognize-improve-sustain strategy to support the government policy of 
rapid decentralization. All too often, much of PFM reform in Africa is about the change 
task and climbing financial summits.  
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#3 IN AFRICA 
 
  Successful public sector reform is rare in Africa. Over twelve years, Ethiopia 
transformed its public financial management to international standards and now has the 
third best system in Africa that is managing the largest aid flows to the continent.
1  
The financial reform succeeded because it was embedded in a government led 
political and administrative reform—decentralization. The reforms were driven by a 
domestic political imperative not a foreign technical agenda, and rapid results were 
needed in public financial management to keep up with the accelerating pace of 
decentralization. Rapid results required improving the existing financial system rather 
than changing it with advanced financial techniques of ‘international best practice.’ 
Against all odds 
  One could not find a more challenging environment than Ethiopia in 1996 in 
which to reform public financial management (PFM). The four horsemen of the 
apocalypse were permanently stabled in country. The country had been devastated by a 
seventeen-year civil war and the revolutionary party that assumed power was an ethnic 
minority with tenuous control over a vast country. The bureaucracy was demoralized 
and many skilled professionals had fled the country. Foreign aid rushed in to support 
the new regime, which produced an inchoate and crowded aid agenda that further 
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1The best public financial management in Africa is ranked as follows: first--South Africa 
(population 49.3 million); second--Mauritius (population 1.3 million); and, third--Ethiopia 
(population 85.2 million) (World Bank, 2010). In an assessment of the evolution of the public 
financial management systems of sixteen African countries from 2001 to 2007, which covers 
the core period of PFM reform in Ethiopia, only Ethiopia scored a nineteen percent 
improvement. Other countries that have been touted as the success stories in Africa scored 
lower: Burkino Faso (8.3%), Mozambique (4.8% with 9.5% mid-period decline), and Tanzania 
the oft-touted poster child (12.5%). See Hedger and de Renzio (2010, p. 3). Table 1 presents the 
achievements of Ethiopia’s public financial management reform.  
   3 
burdened a weak administrative system barely coping with daily operations. The 
government’s strategy of ethnic decentralization to regions implemented shortly after 
the change of power stretched further an already strained administration. Less than two 
years into the start of the reform, the horsemen of war, famine, pestilence and death 
arrived in even greater force.
2  
  Offsetting these odds was the fundamental discipline of Ethiopian society, 
which carried over into the operations of government—prudent, indeed tightfisted, 
management of public resources. It was upon the rock of fiscal discipline and an ethos 
of self-help that this reform was built and why it worked.  
  Allen Schick in his seminal article on the stages of budget reform argues that 
successful budget reform must first establish control before moving to the successive 
stages of management and planning.
3 The discipline of Ethiopian society and its 
government meant that a financial system was in place before the reform began which 
provided reasonably effective control. The control was not efficient however, as the 
country faced a backlog of six to seven years in its accounts, and the existing financial 
system was not up to supporting the government’s ambitious policy of decentralization.  
  This article presents a framework of public sector reform, which is based on the 
experience of a twelve-year PFM reform in Ethiopia, which brought its limited and 
inefficient system of financial control up to international standards and a rating of third 
best in Africa. The lens through which this reform is presented is the Decentralization 
Support Activity (DSA) Project which designed and implemented with government the 
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2 In May of 1998, Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war for two years. In late 2002, Ethiopia 
experienced a one hundred year famine with over fifteen million people at risk of starvation.  
3 Schick (1966). These three budget roles Schick acknowledges comes from Robert Anthony’s 
typology of administrative processes: strategic, planning, management control and operational 
control. See Anthony (1965, pp. 16-18).    4 
reform of five core financial systems: budget planning, budgets, accounts, 
disbursements and financial information systems (Table 1).
4  
The DSA project (henceforth project) succeeded because it followed a prudent 
strategy of reform. Public sector reform involves four processes: recognize, improve, 
change, and sustain. We shall address these in more detail shortly, but in brief, the 
project adopted the following sequence: it recognized the existing system, improved it, 
and introduced change only when absolutely needed. The imperative of rapidly 
decentralizing financial management to tiers of government with limited capacity meant 
that the existing system, though limited, was operationally familiar to staffs and could 
with improvement, be rapidly decentralized. Sustaining the reform was essential which 
the project promoted by strengthening human capacity through training and developing 
an infrastructure for in-service training.
5 In its early years, the project was criticized by 
the Bretton Woods agencies, which the government had excluded from the reform, as 
not doing a reform because it focused on improving systems not changing them. Reform 
need not be ‘change’ and can be any or all of the other three reform processes. The 
project’s strategy of evolving the existing system and changing it only when necessary 
meant that the reform could keep pace with the government’s rapid decentralization. A 
strategy of reform focused on change, would have taken much longer to implement, 
would have had much higher risk, and would have not been available to support the 
decentralization policy.  
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4 Of its $34.7 million budget, the DSA project spent approximately ninety-two percent on 
training over 72,000 government officials. Decentralization Support Activity Project (2006). 
5 The in-service training strategy for the reform was developed early on and the subject of a 
long discussion with the Prime Minister, select members of his cabinet and myself (Peterson, 
1997).    5 
Table 1 
Achievements of the DSA Project 
  1996 
Start of the Reform 
2008 
Project Departs (January) 
Fiscal Management     
    Macro-economic model  None  Developed with 24 staffs trained 
    Macro economic fiscal framework  None  Developed 
Financial Administration     
     Medium term expenditure  
     framework 
None  Macro economic fiscal framework and a  
public investment program 
     Fiscal transfer formula: region to    
     wereda 
Weredas did not receive 
transfers from regions  
Region to wereda fiscal transfer—unit  
cost, needs-based 
     Wereda performance agreements  None  Performance linked to fiscal transfer and  
based on sectoral cost drivers 
     Budget classification  No cross walk 
Inconsistent levels 
1999: cross walk-activity based budget 
4 levels both budgets 
maps to COFOG 
     Chart of accounts  Multiple series 
Discretion with ‘/s’ 
Single series 
     Financial calendar  No budget planning 
Inconsistent  
All key systems  
Consistent 
     Bookkeeping  Single entry  Double entry 
     Basis of accounting  Cash  Modified cash 
     Treasury  Multiple bank accts  Treasury single ledger at federal and  
select regions  
     Treasury  Wereda finances 
Managed at zones 
Wereda finance pool 
     Financial information system  Budget prepared on  
standalone PCs 
in 500+ spreadsheets  
Bespoke IFMIS operating stand alone,  
LAN, WAN 
Budget data base in MS SQL 
Operates in five languages (English, 
Tigrigna, Oromiffa, Amharic, Somali) 
International IT standards 
Operates on extremely low bandwidth  
     Financial information system  Accounts prepared 
on mini-computer batch 
processing at central 
federal and regional 
organizations of finance 
Accounts preparation distributed to sector 
organizations, prepared on-line 
    Training    72,000+ staff trained in budgets and accounts 
    In-service training infrastructure— 
    federal level 
Ethiopian Civil Service 
College not teaching 
government accounting 
or budgeting 
Ethiopian Civil Service 
College teaching government accounting or 
budgeting based on the DSA budget and 
accounting manuals and training modules 
    In-service training infrastructure— 
    regional level 
Regional Management 
Institutes just being 
formed  
Regional Management Institutes formed and 
regularly teaching budgeting and accounting  
Performance     
    Reporting  6-7 year backlog of 
accounts  
Accounts current 
    Budget submission--federal  Compiled just days 
before parliamentary 
review 
Compiled at least a month in advance of 
parliamentary review 
   6 
The project evolved financial control in Ethiopia to international standards. It 
also introduced management and planning reforms that provide lessons on both the 
process and content of introducing variants of advanced techniques suitable to a 
country’s context. The field of PFM reform tends to be dominated by foreign aid 
agencies and is overly normative in its focus on technique. The holy grail of this 
perspective is the search for ‘sequencing of technique.’
6 The Ethiopian reform provides 
a timely corrective to this myopia, and following Schick, the reform started with a focus 
on the control stage, and made it efficient. The financial reform stages of management 
and planning emerged out of a domestic demand to support decentralization (a new 
intra-regional fiscal transfer system) rather than an external supply of technique. The 
donor/lender perspective of the primacy of ‘sequencing techniques’ wrongly specifies 
the dynamic of PFM reform. PFM reform should be about evolving the stages of PFM 
(control, management, planning) based on the domestic needs of the administrative 
system and these can have many configurations in terms of sequence and overlap. 
Sequencing is positive not normative. The Ethiopian reform demonstrates that the key 
to successful public sector reform of which PFM may be a component, is achieving an 
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6 Perhaps the zenith to date of finding the ‘right’ sequence comes from Ronald Quist’s proposal 
to use PEFAs to define reform sequences. Ronald Quist has argued for a ‘Sequencing Rating 
Indicator (SRI)’ based on a 74 by 74 matrix of PEFA sub-indicators that can be expressed in an 
equation. Defining a country’s PFM reform sequence can then be ‘conveniently and 
instantaneously’ calculated by plugging the PEFA scores and sub-matrix into the SRI equation. 
Given that PEFAs do not examine the sources of poor PFM performance in term of systems and 
their execution, it is unclear how one could use this diagnostic to determine a reform sequence. 
See Quist (2009, p. 9).   
   7 
COPS: THE DRIVERS OF PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM 
COPS drive public sector reform: context, ownership, purpose and strategy 
(Table 2). The principal driver of public sector reform in Ethiopia was the context of a 
new government using decentralization to improve service delivery as well as promote 
its legitimacy. Contextual preconditions for reform were largely in place as 
decentralization defined the need, the government’s homegrown Civil Service Reform 
Program specified the help required, and urgency was paramount.
7 The challenge for 
technical assistance was to craft a strategy that built upon 
Table 2 
 
The Drivers of Public Sector Reform 
 
these preconditions and established trust. Trust of external technical assistance was 
especially important, as the government was new and rightfully leery, if not suspicious, 
of foreigners in sensitive government agencies.  Context explains the broad canvas of 
the reform and the specifics of reform of each financial system (e.g. how overnight 
devolution to districts made the budget planning reform extremely urgent for regions). 
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7Public sector reform requires four necessary, though not sufficient conditions: trust, need, help 
and urgency (Peterson, 1996a). 
 
Context  Macro-level: political, social, economic 
             Mid-level: administrative structure, bureaucratic culture, legacy procedures 
             Micro-level: necessary conditions--trust, need, help, urgency 
 
Ownership  Array of shareholders  
             Agents of reform: saints, demons, wizards 
 
Purpose  Policy driven: domestic versus foreign 
    Technique driven: plateaus versus summits 
 
Strategy  Reform processes: recognize, improve, change, sustain   8 
Ownership of reform is often given lip service and confused with commitment, but is 
rarely unpacked in terms of the share holders and their shares (e.g. wholly or minority 
owned by government, donor/lenders, contractors) and the agents involved in the 
reform (the saints who support reform, the demons that don’t, and the wizards who 
design it and help the saints implement reform) (Peterson, 1998). The purpose of reform 
is often assumed, indeed not critically scrutinized, and not used to define a vision of 
where it is all going. Unfortunately, in Africa the vision of PFM reform is one of 
attempting the summits of international best practice, rather than consolidating the 
basics of a firm financial plateau. The success of the Ethiopian reform was in large 
measure due to an appropriate strategy of reform focused on recognition and 
improvement of existing systems and judicious change.  
CONTEXT  
Virtually every account of PFM reform begins and ends with the observation 
that PFM reform is contextual. Context has three dimensions: macro-level (political, 
social, economic), mid-level (administrative structure, bureaucratic culture, legacy 
procedures), and micro-level (necessary but not sufficient conditions for reform—trust, 
need, help and urgency). The political context was the triumph of the Tigrayan ethnic 
group after seventeen years of civil war. As a minority, the Tigrayans needed to rapidly 
consolidate power, which meant penetration of the country, especially the rural areas 
through decentralization. Decentralization was conducted in two phases the first being 
the establishment in 1994 of ethnic federalism in nine regions.
8 A deeper 
decentralization below the regions to weredas was conducted in 2002 with the rationale 
of bypassing regional political organizations that were gaining strength and becoming 
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8 In addition to its nine regions, Ethiopia has two administrative areas: Addis Ababa and Dire 
Dawa.    9 
more loosely aligned with the central party. Making decentralization work was a 
strategy of regime survival. To promote effective decentralization, the government 
developed on its own within the Prime Minister’s Office, a far-reaching Civil Service 
Reform Program a component of which was PFM.
9 So the macro political context for 
the PFM reform was not just firmly in place, there was no higher priority because it was 
core to the political strategy of control and in turn, the government policy of 
decentralization.  
Ethiopian culture, the macro social context, reinforced the political context. The 
severe discipline of the culture ensured adherence to political direction. This discipline 
extended to public finance as Ethiopia was the only country in Africa with single digit 
inflation from 1955-1995 and despite its currency being tied to the U.S. dollar, Ethiopia 
continued on the gold standard after the U.S. departed the standard in 1971. If a PFM 
reform is to succeed, it must begin with a government living within its means—the hard 
budget constraint.  
The second level of context, mid-level, is comprised of the administrative 
structure, the bureaucratic culture, and the legacy administrative procedures. The 
administrative structure includes the tiers of government (federal, region, administrative 
area, zone, wereda and kabelle) and the structures within tiers (e.g. the organization of 
the Ministry of Finance). During the PFM reform the structure of government and 
administration underwent dramatic change. Overnight in 2002, the government 
delegated financial responsibility over the bulk of regional resources to weredas. Also 
during the reform, the separate organizations of finance and planning were merged. Into 
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9 The Civil Service Reform Program (CSRP) had five sub-programs: Top Systems 
Management, Human Resources, Service Delivery, Ethics and Expenditure Management and 
Control (EMCP) (Task Force for Civil Service Reform, 1996). The DSA project implemented 
five components under the EMCP: budget planning, budgeting, accounting, cash management, 
and information systems.    10 
these dramatic changes the PFM reform was introduced and how this turbulence 
promoted or hindered reform was the key contextual dynamic shaping the reform. Our 
thesis is that this change was fundamental to opening up the bureaucracy to people in 
new roles that were more receptive to doing their jobs better. Turbulence created the 
opportunity for reform.  
The third or micro-level of context is whether there are the necessary, though 
not sufficient conditions in place for a reform program and supporting technical 
assistance to succeed. The necessary conditions of reform are trust, need, help, and 
urgency (Peterson, 1996a). Trust was secured from the start in large part, because it was 
a government not foreign aid designed reform. The government ensured its trust in the 
design of the reform by dividing and managing the foreign technical assistance it 
requested to implement its reform. The Bretton Woods agencies were specifically 
excluded because the government did not want to take loans for the reform, nor did they 
want their financial patrons inside the house. While there was trust in the design of the 
reform, the various technical assistance projects had to build trust at the operational, and 
at times, strategic level. Trust is built through a momentum of success and small wins 
achieved with close partnership of government staff. That was the formula for success 
of the DSA project.  
The need for strengthening financial management was clear to all though the 
need for some of the components of the reform, especially the budget planning reform, 
were not seen by the federal ministries of finance and planning as a need. The design of 
the DSA technical assistance project was viewed as appropriate help to address the 
needs in two areas initially (budget, accounts), to which was added budget planning, 
financial information systems, and disbursements. Urgency was of the essence due to   11 
the overnight, mid-fiscal year decentralization of financial management from regions to 
weredas. 
OWNERSHIP 
The political context confirmed sole government ownership over this reform. 
The Prime Minister personally chaired the Civil Service Reform Program (CSRP) from 
its inception in 1995-1996 until the commencement of hostilities with Eritrea in May of 
1998. The CSRP was quietly developed within the Prime Minister’s Office with no 
input from foreign aid agencies and with only one expatriate advisor.
10 The war with 
Eritrea that began approximately two years after the CSRP was unveiled reinforced 
government ownership. Most foreign aid agencies dramatically downsized their staff 
and programs and some key donors to the PFM reform, notably the European 
Commission that had agreed to fund the financial information system under the PFM 
reform, stopped all assistance.
11  
Ownership can be viewed in terms of who are the shareholders (i.e. government, 
donor/lenders, contractors, and others—civil society) and how many shares they hold 
(i.e. majority, minority). Owners in turn can be further understood in terms of the roles 
they play in reform: saints (government staffs who lead and protect the reform), demons 
(any actor that actively obstructs or passively fails to support the reform), and wizards 
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10 The lone expatriate advisor, Peter Silkin, was directly contracted by the government who 
learned about him through its own connections established during the civil war. An auditor from 
the National Audit Office in the U.K., the CSRP was Peter’s first foray in providing technical 
assistance to a foreign government. The focus on control in the design of the EMCP was clearly 
influenced by Peter’s audit background.  
11 The European Commission is barred from funding countries in conflict. The U.S. government 
did draw down all non-essential personnel throughout the duration of the conflict but allowed 
contractors to remain if they accepted all responsibility for their safety. USAID funded the DSA 
project and all of its staffs remained in Ethiopia throughout the war. The decision to continue 
U.S. assistance to Ethiopia was in part a political objective of not leaving an ally in the lurch.    12 
(the technical and managerial resource persons assisting the saints in implementing the 
reform) (Peterson, 1998).
12 
Domestic not foreign ownership over the CSRP and its PFM component was 
clarified from the very start. A defining feature of the Ethiopian PFM reform is that for 
over a decade, the Government excluded the Bretton Woods organizations from 
participating in the core areas of the CSRP. The Government did request bilateral donor 
(not lender) agencies to provide support to components of its comprehensive civil 
service reform—a strategy of divide and manage foreign aid.
13  
Clarifying the ownership of reform was critical to the success of Ethiopia’s 
financial reform. But excluding the Bretton Woods and compartmentalizing donor 
assistance was not the only ownership to be clarified. The federal government did not 
have a domestic monopoly over this reform as regional governments made it very clear 
when the reform arrived in their jurisdiction, that they were responsible. So there were 
two principal tracks of reform—federal and regional, and within the regional track there 
was considerable diversity. Reinforcing the two tracks of PFM reform and systems in 
Ethiopia are the very different roles of the federal level in disbursing and consolidating 
financial reports and the regional level that is responsible for service delivery.  
The first track, the federal reform, was where the reform began. In brief, the 
federal reform developed the crosscutting structures (budget classification, chart of 
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12 Wizards are not an undifferentiated good. Wizards can be classified as appropriate (they have 
relevant and lengthy experience and judgment), inappropriate (they lack the qualities of the 
appropriate wizards) and imposters. A common fault of wizards is that they tend to view a new 
assignment as a continuation of the previous country they worked in and tend not to adequately 
see the new context. They also tend to take the easy path of installing a cookie cutter approach 
of technique and sequencing and pay little attention to context.  
13 Excluded from the CSRP, the Bretton Woods agencies made a concerted effort to gain 
involvement in the financial reform in Ethiopia, which at times meant criticizing the ongoing 
reform. These agencies spearheaded the creation of the Ministry of Capacity Building, which 
was created several years after the CSRP had begun and this caused significant tension with the 
Ministry of Finance over the leadership of the PFM reform.   13 
accounts, financial calendar) embedded in an information system that assured 
consistency of the PFM system amongst all of the tiers. But from the beginning, the 
federal reform was not a national reform. The work of reform was organized into 
federally staffed reform teams with members picked from the functional specialties of 
the Ministries of Finance and Planning. These exclusive reform clubs were established 
in three areas: expenditure planning, budgeting and accounting. These clubs excluded 
membership of federal sectoral ministries and regional organizations.  
A critical question for a PFM reform in a decentralized government, is what role 
should the central ministries of finance and planning play? In a prelude to the design of 
its support to the Government’s CSRP reform, USAID invited the former Minister of 
Finance to share his thoughts on financial management in Ethiopia. His frank assertion 
that the Ministry of Finance was in danger of becoming a ‘post office’ struck and stuck 
with me ever since. A post office is a good metaphor for the Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministry of Planning for its national not federal role—delivering the fiscal transfers and 
collecting and consolidating reports. At the start of the reform in 1996, the Ministry of 
Finance was responsible for the federal recurrent budget while the Ministry of Planning 
was responsible for the federal capital budget. Economic policy was made in the Prime 
Ministers Office, as was close scrutiny of the capital budget. The finance and planning 
ministries did not have a significant policy function. Indeed, the critical fiscal transfer 
formula for federal to region allocations was excluded from the EMCP and eventually 
the role of the merged Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED) in   14 
providing technical guidance on the formula was transferred to the House of 
Federation.
14  
Defining the role of the Ethiopian ministries of finance and planning as one of a 
post office is not pejorative nor is it surprising. Policy in a one party state rests with the 
inner circles of the party, not a federal bureaucracy. The post office role meant that the 
federal ministries maintained a limited role viz a viz the regions. A critical question of 
PFM management in a decentralized system is the boundaries of federal and regional 
finance institutions. Interestingly, and to their credit, the federal ministries in Ethiopia 
erred on the side of minimum rather than maximum intervention. The relative autonomy 
of regions was a key factor in the success of the reform as it allowed regional context to 
play out which was especially important in managing second stage decentralization to 
weredas.  
Track 2 of the reform, the regional and district reform, was focused on building 
the capacity of weredas to deliver front-line services, principally primary education, 
health care and eventually, food security. Interestingly, three months into the pilot 
reform in the SNNPR, the government directed that financial management be devolved 
to weredas. At a stroke, sixty to seventy percent of all regional financial resources were 
to be transferred to weredas. This ‘second stage’ devolution changed the goal posts of 
the reform eight fold. Second stage devolution also laid to rest any significant federal 
role in the reform and confirmed a two-track (federal and region) strategy. Second stage 
devolution also firmly laid to rest foreign aid intervention in the PFM reform.  
Ownership is a fundamental concept in public sector reform in general and in 
PFM reform specifically. The management of public money goes to the heart of 
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14 To manage decentralization, Ethiopia has a federal body, the House of Federation, which is 
responsible for among other federal issues, approving the fiscal transfer formula, which 
determines the transfer from the central government to regional governments.    15 
sovereignty and it is not appropriate for foreign aid to demand, much less manage, the 
change of PFM systems. Government can request support, which is, very different from 
foreign aid ‘inviting themselves’ which is often the case and indeed is often part of the 
first paragraph of their mission reports. 
Beyond the critical issue of impinging on the sovereignty of African states, the 
core problem of PFM on the continent is execution not systems (Linert, 2002; Stevens, 
2005). Foreign aid largely concerns itself with the establishment of new systems and the 
dilemmas of sequencing techniques. The execution task tends to be neglected in large 
part because it is fundamentally an issue of improving government management of 
staffs and organizations and thus outside the purview of foreign aid. The decision by 
foreign aid agencies to use government financial systems for the delivery of loans and 
grants should be binary with appropriate benchmarks as necessary.  
Pundits of PFM reform stress the importance of high-level commitment and 
authority but they don’t dwell on ownership.
15 One reason for that is that the drivers of 
most PFM reforms in Africa are foreign aid agencies and the notion of ownership over a 
core sovereign function raises delicate contradictions. While ownership of the reform 
may have been fragmented or more accurately, compartmentalized between tiers of 
government (federal and region) in Ethiopia, it was always domestic not foreign and 
that made all the difference.  
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15 One finds in some foreign aid frameworks of PFM reform phrases such as ‘acceptance’ and 
‘authority.’ Governments, especially in developing countries, are command and control systems 
and executing a government reform has little to with acceptance or authority—these exist by 
definition. Illustrative of a foreign aid focused framework of PFM reform from an armchair 
observer is Matt Andrews’ odd ‘hippo minders, camel seekers, and oasis builders,’ which was 
unveiled to the Center for International Development, Harvard Kennedy School, Fall 2009.    16 
PURPOSE 
Ownership is the defining variable of a financial reform and it connotes 
property—physical and intellectual. Public financial management is a constituent part of 
sovereignty, which defines the state as property. To capture the qualities of property and 
ownership it is useful to think about a PFM system as a plateau. A well-established 
PFM plateau has an array of the basic systems of financial control (e.g. budgets, 
accounts, audit) that are adequately executed and sustained with government resources 
(funding, staffing, institutions). A plateau should be the wholly owned property of a 
government and it extends beyond PFM and encompasses the structure of government 
and administration. Successful PFM reform is aligned with the needs of government 
and fits within these structures.  
The PFM reform in Ethiopia can be viewed as the building of multiple 
plateaus—the most fundamental geographic distinction being the federal and regional 
plateaus—which differed because of their functions—post office versus service 
delivery. As noted above, the regional reform created different plateaus both within the 
large and high capacity regions (Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR, Tigray) and within the 
small and low capacity regions. Second stage devolution created a new set of plateaus—
the wereda plateau—that differed significantly from the federal and regional plateaus by 
its use of a financial pool.
16 A daunting challenge in reforming PFM in a country with 
the depth and breadth and width (the types) of decentralization as found in Ethiopia, is 
how to build appropriate plateaus in the various tiers of government while also 
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16 Given the immediacy of building financial management capacity in weredas and the limited 
number of finance staffs, a finance pool was created in the wereda finance office, which 
concentrated the finance function of weredas in one office. The pool removed budget execution 
and procurement from the spending offices, which tightened financial control. The pool 
arrangement of the wereda plateau was not introduced in any other tier of government.    17 
maintaining coherence of financial management.
17 The plateau is a useful metaphor for 
understanding the complexities.  
  Practitioners need a metaphor of PFM that is accessible, comprehensive and 
relevant. As accessible, the metaphor should help practitioners translate, indeed 
visualize, the complex array of PFM inputs (systems), throughputs (processes) and 
outputs (quality). As comprehensive, the metaphor should capture the key relationships 
between the parts and the parts with the whole. As relevant, it should direct the 
practitioner to the strengths and weaknesses (the bedrock and the crevices) of a 
country’s PFM.  
Plateau as a Perspective on PFM 
  Plateaus provide a nuanced perspective of a country’s PFM. As territory, it 
stresses the sovereignty of PFM, which is a core function of the state. As a point of 
departure or destination, it stresses the need to recognize what exists and the need to 
establish the basics of financial control. As geology, it reminds one of the difficulty of 
changing administrative structures and the virtue of the stability of those structures. As 
landscape, it presents how the parts relate to the whole (financial systems and their 
execution as well PFM and the broader structure of government and administration). As 
place, it reminds one that PFM is a cultural, linguistic, and historical artifact.
18 As 
environmental quality, it brings focus to the quality (output) of PFM—sustainability, 
sectoral allocation, composition of expenditure, and risk. As elevation, it shows how 
decentralized systems have different plateaus at varying elevations (capacity and 
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17 For a description and analysis of the three types of decentralization see Cohen and Peterson 
(1999, pp. 19-50). 
18 The first offering of the Harvard Executive Program in Public Financial Management was 
held at Egerton College Kenya in 1987 and Harris Mule, then Permanent Secretary of the 
Ministry of Finance of the government of Kenya, opined that budgeting is a language and a 
‘fragile tradition’ that one should take care in changing.   18 
sophistication) and the challenge of maintaining communication with diverse terrain. As 
layers, it brings focus to what is bedrock and what are the fault lines. Finally, a plateau 
perspective illustrates the virtues of a PFM reform sequence of recognize-improve-
sustain, rather than defining reform as only change. Reform as building a plateau not a 
summit accords with what Karl Weick calls the ‘small wins’ approach to successful 
implementation of public policy. 
  A series of small wins is also more structurally sound than a large win 
because small wins are stable building blocks….A small win is a  
concrete, complete, implemented outcome of moderate importance.  
By itself, one small win may seem unimportant. A series of small wins 
at small but significant tasks, however, reveals a pattern that may 
attract allies, deter opponents, and lower resistance to subsequent  
proposals. Small wins are controllable opportunities that produce 
visible results (Weick, 1984, p. 43).  
Small wins also reduce the risk of reform. 
  Small wins are like short stacks. They preserve gains, they cannot  
  unravel, each one requires less coordination to execute, interruptions 
  such as might occur when there is a change in political administration 
  have limited effects, and subparts can be assembled into different  
configurations [they can be adapted to different plateaus] (Weick,  
1984, p. 44).  
Building PFM plateaus does not imply that a country’s PFM has ‘plateaued’ meaning 
that further reform is not possible or even needed. The plateau metaphor reinforces the 
oft-heard recommendation in the PFM field of the need to first ‘get the basics right’, 
which means having a firm and coherent base—a plateau.   
 
   19 
Plateaus not Summits in Africa 
The plateau metaphor illustrates one of the principal causes of failure of public 
sector and PFM reforms in Africa—the focus on summits of sophisticated techniques 
(international best practice) rather than improving the bedrock of plateaus—basic 
systems and their execution (appropriate to locale). Many public financial management 
reforms in Africa have been akin to the attempts of climbers to summit high altitude 
peaks. Few make it, those that do don’t stay long, and most fatalities occur in the 
descent.
19 In recent years, financial summits in Africa have included several techniques 
that governments and their technical advisors have slipped on—Medium Term 
Expenditure Frameworks, performance/program budgeting, Integrated Financial 
Management Information Systems, accrual accounting, and business process 
reengineering to name just a few. The summit strategy and the techniques that underpin 
it are inappropriate for most if not all African governments. Financial summiting is 
costly, risky and not needed.  
An appropriate strategy for guiding African governments that promotes 
ownership, and establishes good financial control is to build solid financial plateaus. 
Only once a government has a financial plateau that is stable and sustainable, should it 
consider building a higher (more sophisticated) plateau. Governments should make such 
a decision alone and it should be justified in terms of improving outcomes—does it 
promote growth and social wellbeing.
20 There is considerable evidence from developed 
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19 Krakauer (1997). Unlike climbers that make mistakes and perish on Himalayan peaks, 
technical assistance advisors and their firms often live another day and another contract. There 
is a serious issue of accountability in this profession with two year wonders (contracts) which 
mean technical assistance leaves before it is held accountable for results and negative results 
rarely if ever follow them.   
20 Beyond the risk, cost and dubious return, governments, and hopefully their foreign aid 
partners need to recognize that it takes a long time to implement a PFM reform—SIDA 
estimates it takes twelve to fifteen years (SIDA, 2007).   20 
and developing country experience that advanced public financial techniques, assuming 
they can be made to work, do not improve the outcomes of public expenditure (Mellet 
et al., 2009).  
In an important corrective to the emphasis on summiting, Ian Linert and in turn 
Mike Stevens have pointed out that most PFM systems in Africa are robust but not well 
executed (Linert, 2002; Stevens, 2004). Naomi Caiden and Aaron Wildavsky observed 
many years ago that if a government could not execute an annual budget, which is a 
one-year plan, it made little sense to embark on multi-year planning (Caiden and 
Wildavsky, 1990, pp. 315-322). Until African governments can execute the basics of 
financial control, it is not prudent for them to attempt to scale the higher elevations of 
financial technique. Even if governments attempt and reach these higher summits with 
intensive support (oxygen?) of their foreign guides, the path is risky and unsustainable.    
The lust for summits by mountaineers ‘because they are there,’ should not be the 
driver of government financial reform—yes other techniques are there—but are they 
needed? Summiting has constituencies while plateaus do not. Financial summits are 
attractive to donor/lenders for several reasons: they are a source of benchmarks for 
conditionality, many involve significant commodity dumps (e.g. Integrated Financial 
Management Systems) which allow rapid disbursement of funds, they facilitate the 
placement of technical assistance personnel within core government functions who can 
monitor their funding and financial risk, they extend their influence over government, 
and they support the business model of technical assistance departments of foreign aid 
agencies. Governments are attracted to summits in part, because they are told to do so 
as part of conditionality and the need to be modern with international best practice. But 
a more telling reason for government support of summits is that they often generate   21 
handsome rents—especially in large-scale financial automation projects. Plateaus are 
built on domestic not foreign resources, which limits the opportunities for rents. 
Plateaus do place a demand on the domestic budget (the fungibility of money 
notwithstanding), but that is good, because supporting systems are principally about 
better management of government staff and organizations, which are existing (and 
modest) budget commitments. Financial summits also provide cash cows for contractors 
because implementing projects with a complex scope within government bureaucracies 
that have limited capacity to manage even simple contracts makes it highly likely that 
project schedule and budget will be extended.  
Plateaus and Platforms 
Given the increasing use of the term ‘platform’ in PFM, it is important to 
distinguish it from the concept of a plateau. PFM can be viewed as having three 
platforms: transaction, policy and legal (Table 3). The transaction platform includes the 
systems of financial administration—revenue, budgeting, accounting, cash management 
and information systems and is a recognition that PFM systems are fundamentally about 
managing transactions. The policy platform includes fiscal management (macro-
economic framework, fiscal architecture) as well as the outputs and outcome of the 
transactions (performance and program budgeting). The legal oversight platform 
includes the legal framework (constitution, organic budget law, financial regulations) 
and external audit and the legislative oversight. Effective PFM systems require that all 
three platforms perform well. The sequence of PFM reform is the array of reform to the 
components within and between these three platforms.  
  A later and very different formulation of the platform concept emerges from the 
literature on policy-based foreign aid and the conditionalities needed to reduce fiduciary   22 
risk. Peter Brooke notes that the value of the platform approach is ‘in providing greater 
clarity to both the Governments and donors about the rules of engagement and 
disbursement and what each expects of the other in the partnership.’
21 The Brooke 
platform approach views PFM reform as driven by the real or perceived needs of 
foreign aid. Our platform approach is generic and locates reform within the drivers of 
the reform (COPS) with sequencing emerging from the strategy of reform (the 
processes of recognize, improve, change and sustain) discussed next. 	 ﾠ
Table 3
22 
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21 Brooke (2003, p. 2). See also Department for International Development (2005). 
22 The three platforms of PFM were introduced in the Executive Program in Public Financial 
Management at the Kennedy School of Government in Summer 2002. I am indebted to Perran 
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STRATEGY 
  There are four tasks in public sector reform: recognize, improve, change and 
sustain. The Ethiopian pathway of reform was a sequence of recognize-improve-sustain 
and only if absolutely necessary, change. It was a pathway of building a plateau. This 
reform sequence was appropriate given the priority of supporting rapid decentralization. 
One can argue, that the principal problem with public sector reform in general and PFM 
reform specifically in Africa, is defining reform as change, often perpetual, and 
ignoring the other tasks of reform. 
Recognize 
Recognizing meaning understanding and respecting what exists, is the first and 
often most neglected step in reform. Recognizing also means not dismissing, indeed 
denigrating, ongoing reforms to impose one’s own.
23 All to often, governments in 
developing countries do not understand the strengths of their systems and are too quick 
to change them, often on the advice of others.
24  The practice of a cursory review of 
existing systems, if at all, before leaping to major reform in PFM in Africa is akin to the 
reengineering movement of the 1990s which advocated only a brief look at business 
processes on the grounds that they were going to be replaced (Hammer, 1995, p. 19). 
Taking the Linert/Stevens argument that PFM systems in Africa are robust but not 
executed, one must thoroughly understand them to have confidence that they are indeed 
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23 A problem with PFM reforms in Africa is having too many cooks in the kitchen. In many 
countries, separate foreign aid initiatives compete, overlap and undermine existing PFM 
operations and ongoing reforms. A silver lining for the Ethiopian reform was the Eritrean war 
that began less than two years into the reform, which sent most foreign aid agencies packing for 
two or more years. Only the DSA project cooks were left in the kitchen.  
24 The author co-founded Harvard University’s Executive Program in Public Financial 
Management twenty-four years ago. Well over a thousand senior government finance officials 
have been trained over the years and a major take away especially by participants from Africa, 
was an appreciation of how good their systems were.    24 
robust and if so, what if anything, should be done.
25 Adequate description is especially 
critical in countries that are decentralized because they often have multiple systems 
(plateaus) changing on different timetables. While one can find detailed descriptions of 
the parts of a country’s PFM system (e.g. accounting), it is rare to find comprehensive 
description of a country’s PFM and the nuances across its plateaus. In countries that are 
decentralized, or even in countries that are centralized but have extremes in capacity, 
there is not ‘one’ PFM system and PFM reformers with a focus on technique, often fail 
to appreciate these differences that do matter. In Ethiopia for example, there was 
considerable confusion by foreign aid over the impact of their grants and loans on the 
offset of the fiscal transfer from federal to regional governments. For years, this 
confusion rippled throughout PFM management (e.g. medium term planning, 
budgeting, and accounting). Decentralization poses considerable complexity to the 
delivery of foreign aid and donor/lenders need to particularly recognize the nuances and 
the impact of their funding. 
The recognition task of reform is significant for it focuses one on the definition 
of the problem rather than the leap to the solution. Unfortunately, PFM reform is much 
about technique and sequence and little about hard questions—why change and how 
does it improve outcomes. Again, the strategy of small wins makes sense. 
The strategy of small wins addresses social problems by working directly 
on their construction and indirectly on their resolution…. A shift of  
attention away from outcomes toward inputs is not trivial, because the  
content of appropriate solutions is often implied by the definition of  
of what needs to be solved. To focus on the process of problem definition 
is to incorporate a more substantial portion of psychology, specifically, its  
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25 An early diagnostic of Ethiopia’s PFM system was conducted by Peterson through the 
European Commission funded Social Expenditure Review conducted by Oxford University in 
1996 (Peterson, 1996b). See also Peterson (1996c).   25 
understanding of processes of appraisal, social construction of reality,  
problem finding, and definition of the situation (Weick, 1984, p. 40). 
Richard Allen, echoes this need for better recognition of the problem before leaping to 
the toolbox of techniques by noting that IMF finance advisors ‘are too technical (Allen, 
2010)’ and that they need to ‘fumble around in the dark (Allen, 2009, p. 25).’  
  Overlooking the recognition task of reform is promoted by the dominant PFM 
diagnostic of the day, the Public Expenditure Financial Accountability Framework 
(PEFA), which is used to assess a country’s PFM (PEFA, 2005). A comprehensive 
assessment of a country’s PFM should cover the inputs (systems, execution), 
throughput (performance of process), and outputs (the quality and impact of 
expenditure). The PEFA examines only throughput and as such, principally functions 
like a temperature gauge in a vehicle telling the driver whether the engine is 
overheating. Taking the analogy further, a PEFA does not tell the driver where the car is 
going, or the capabilities of the engine and transmission, or the maintenance schedule. 
Perhaps the principal weakness of a PEFA is that is does not allow for a cursory 
inspection under the hood (examining the inputs of PFM—systems and the elements of 
execution) to see the cause of overheating.
26 At best, the PEFA is a very partial 
recognition of a country’s PFM system. By focusing on throughput, and thus funds 
flow, the PEFA diagnostic is of particular interest to donor/lenders and their concern for 
the flow of their funds, while most governments tend to be focused on outputs if only to 
promote their legitimacy (and control) through the delivery of services.  
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26 Since PEFAs don’t look at the inputs and their link to outputs, they cannot specify an action 
plan because they do not address causality. A further deficiency of the PEFA is that it does not 
cover decentralized systems although there is an initiative to elaborate guidelines for multi-
tiered assessments.    26 
A promising new PFM diagnostic is the Country Integrated Fiduciary 
Assessment (CIFA), which examines all three attributes of a PFM system (inputs, 
throughputs and outputs). The bottom line of a CIFA unlike a PEFA is that it presents 
an action plan for PFM reform going forward which is meant to address the risks of a 
country’s PFM, which is of importance to governments and foreign aid alike.  
Improve 
  Improving what exists is the essence of a small win. Improving also fits with the 
reality found in most African governments of systems being robust but not adequately 
executed. Toning up what exists and focusing on strengthening execution (i.e. in-service 
training, schemes of service, organization of finance functions) can have significant 
payoffs at modest cost.  Reforms that focus on improving rather than changing, are 
faster, cheaper, less risky, and are less disruptive of daily operations. Most important, 
reform as improvement ensures that government remains in the driver’s seat of 
management and operation of PFM. 
 Change 
  Change should be done judiciously and justified in terms of improving the 
quality of PFM outputs (e.g. sectoral allocation, composition of expenditure).  
Returning to Everest, the key to surviving the climb, whether one summits or not, is the 
establishment and adherence to ironclad decision rules before the climb (Krakauer, 
1997, pp. 284-288). On Everest, while summiting may be an option, survival should not 
be. Most fatalities occur on the descent, often by those who successfully reached the 
summit but did not follow the decision rules of when to turn back.
27 As with 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
27 The failure to follow the rules of the climb is often the result of ‘summit fever’ and severe 
degradation of judgment due to oxygen deprivation. I shall leave it to the reader to decide the 
degree and causes of impairment of judgment, which many PFM reforms on the continent 
reflect.    27 
mountaineering, the significantly higher risk of changing rather than improving PFM 
requires clear rules to manage risk and avoid failure. Over the course of the reform, the 
DSA project developed several rules of reform.
 28 
Two rules in particular were critical to the success of this reform. First, make the 
existing system current. Introducing a new financial system (e.g. moving from single 
entry to double entry bookkeeping) while officials struggle with backlogs in accounts 
and are not efficiently managing the existing system, overtaxes capacity and is a 
prescription for failure of both systems. With limited manpower that is constantly 
turning over, it is difficult to juggle two balls (systems) at once.
29  For new systems to 
succeed, the legacy system must be made sufficiently efficient to free up staffs to learn 
the improved/new system and run both systems until the improved/new system can fully 
come on stream.  
A second key rule of reform the project followed was to put in place the 
infrastructure needed to support existing systems (e.g. in-service training facilities and 
programs), which could then be used later to support new systems.
30 Having the 
infrastructure in place for supporting PFM means that these systems can adapt to rapid 
changes in government policy. Given that PFM reforms are very long-term affairs, they 
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28 Through hard won experience, the DSA project established seven principles which guided the 
reform: (1) financial reform should be led by finance institutions; (2) devolution should be 
completed before the budget and accounts reforms are introduced; (3) simplification of the 
wereda financial management (reducing the number of budget institutions) should precede the 
budget reform; (4) accounts should be current before the budget reform is introduced; (5) 
budget reform should precede accounts reform; (6) reforms should be properly resourced; and, 
(7) senior government officials should understand the reform (Harvard University, 2004, pp. 12-
14). 
29 Some governments attempt to juggle three or more systems at once. Ethiopia now has three 
financial information systems—one functioning, one under perpetual development and a newly 
contracted COTS IFMIS.  
30 The establishment of the in-service training program in the regions prior to the rollout of the 
procedural reform was critical to the success of the reform. Second stage devolution, which was 
introduced overnight with no warning, succeeded because fortunately, the in-service training 
program had been in place in the four largest regions and the regions had selected wereda level 
staff in particular for training.    28 
must be designed for the inevitable and often disruptive political and administrative 
changes. It is far easier to weather a violent storm from a firm plateau, than from an 
exposed summit.  
One rule governments find difficult to exercise is when to stop a reform or 
exercise the role of a flagman to delay eager initiatives that cannot be entertained at that 
moment. The introduction of new systems must have clear benchmarks to measure 
progress and absorption by government. Lack of discipline of adhering to this rule has 
been the principal reason for the widespread and costly failures of financial automation 
projects in Africa.
31 
  While recognizing the risk of changing financial systems, two striking lessons 
emerge from the Ethiopian reform. First, if proper preparations are made for the 
introduction of a new system, capacity is not as serious a constraint as expected. More 
often than not, the DSA project was pleasantly surprised on the upside of the 
capabilities of federal and regional governments to defy dire capacity warnings and 
implement the reform.
32  
Capacity and the need to build it is often an overstated constraint to reform. 
Again, some armchair observers of PFM reform have elevated ‘ability’ (read capacity) 
to be a key factor in reform. The twelve-year experience from Ethiopia shows that 
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31 On failure rates of IFMISs in Africa see Dorotinsky (2003). One reason governments and 
their donor/lender patrons are hesitant to stop a project, especially those that are as visible and 
costly as automation projects, is that they are sunk costs and failure and the waste of public 
funds has to be explained and officials within government and foreign aid agencies (if they 
provided funding) need to be held accountable. An example of failing to stop a non-performing 
reform is Ethiopia’s IBEX 2 automation project, which was tasked to implement a modest 
upgrade of the existing financial information system, and is still vaporware after three years.  
32 The DSA project accounting advisors were very concerned about the directive from 
government to move from single to double entry bookkeeping. The initial design of the EMCP 
to remain with single entry. The project advisors were justified in their concerns given that the 
average educational qualification of finance staffs was tenth grade. The change to double entry 
was a surprisingly smooth success but was the result of a carefully crafted in-service training 
program.    29 
ability is an overrated binding constraint to PFM reform. Again, taking the 
Linert/Stevens proposition that PFM systems in Africa are robust but not executed, this 
suggests that the constraint of execution is one of the incentives of management not 
ability.  Capacity building initiatives can also become welcome commodity dumps for 
foreign aid (and rents for government). Capacity building often becomes blue sky—
some is good, more is better, and even more is even better. Blaming the lack of capacity 
is often a far too easy explanation for failure and excuse for not doing the due diligence 
of understanding what exists and working with it.  
A second lesson from the reform was that change worked if driven by a clear not 
derived need (e.g. the need to have an equitable intra-regional transfer formula with the 
advent of second stage decentralization to weredas). The reform demonstrated that 
properly nuanced advanced PFM techniques (e.g. performance frameworks and costing 
methods) could be introduced if driven by demand rather than supply.   
Sustain 
Sustaining is the orphan of reform. As noted above, it lacks constituencies. 
Sustaining a reform, however, is the key to effective execution of systems, and that is 
the weak link in PFM reform in Africa. Sustaining is the ‘operating and maintenance 
(o&m)’ of reform. Governments the world over underfunds o&m and gives priority to 
new expenditure (capital) and required expenditure (recurrent wage and recurrent 
statutory). O&M is discretionary. The dearth of resources for sustaining existing PFM 
systems is a reflection of the broader PFM problem—poor composition of 
expenditure.
33 Developing a strategy for sustaining a reform, especially for in-service 
training, should not be an after-thought or a last minute agenda as a technical assistance 
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33 The composition of expenditure refers to the respective balance of expenditure (recurrent 
wage, recurrent o&m, recurrent statutory and capital) for a particular activity.    30 
project is closing down, much less, the glimmer for a follow-on technical assistance 
project. From the start of the Ethiopian reform, the project defined the key constraint as 
training and indeed one of the first initiatives was to establish a training infrastructure at 
the federal and regional levels that could prepare finance officials for the reform and 
train future staffs to sustain it.
34 The virtue of a small wins plateau approach to PFM 
reform, is that sustainability is developed all along. 
ALIGNMENT AND THE QUALITY OF REFORM 
The key to successful public sector reform is alignment with the four drivers of 
reform. If the alignment is good, good things happen. The concern, indeed fixation, 
within the field of PFM about sequencing, is misplaced. Sequencing emerges from 
alignment and experience from Ethiopia shows that there is considerable flexibility in 
sequencing. The core management task of the DSA project during this reform was to 
maintain good alignment under rapidly changing conditions. The most important 
alignment of this reform was building financial plateaus at the lowest and weakest tier 
of government, rather than summiting from the highest and most capable tier.  
Poor Alignment, Poor Reform 
  A brief example of a PFM reform that has not worked in Ethiopia can be 
explained by our framework of alignment of the drivers of public sector reform. In 
2004, just prior to the rollout of the budget and accounts reform to the Oromia region, a 
Bretton Woods agency criticized the reform and recommended the introduction of 
performance/program budgeting. Two years later and once the dust of the government 
designed EMCP reform had been completed in Oromia and nearly all of the other 
regions, the federal government attempted this initiative in five federal agencies. The 
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34 The in-service training program for budget and accounts was presented and approved by the 
Prime Minister. See Peterson (1997).   31 
government had to stop this initiative mid-fiscal year because the five agencies could 
not complete their budgets and were delaying the submission of the federal budget to 
parliament. Ever persistent, the initiative continued and in late 2010, the technical 
assistance advisor responsible for developing the performance/program budget departed 
after a year and one-half leaving a manual which was deemed to be of no use by the 
federal budget team.  
  The lack of alignment with the drivers of public sector reform explains the 
failure of this initiative. From its inception, the reform failed to respect the government 
policy of rapidly rolling out and completing the ongoing reform. This initiative was 
launched just prior to the critical and massive task of reforming Oromia with its 280 
plus weredas and the training of over 8,000 staffs. This initiative also failed to recognize 
the achievements already on the ground specifically, the development of performance 
agreements for weredas that were improving the core government policy—front-line 
service delivery at weredas. This initiative was professionally irresponsible and poorly 
designed and to echo Richard Allen, it was all about technique not context. The 
initiative was about a federal summit rather than sustaining regional and sub-regional 
plateaus. Whether or not this summit will ever be reached is of little consequence 
because it does not address the key issue of PFM in Ethiopia—the performance of the 
wereda plateau.
35 
 Progress is not certain, and unfortunately since 2008 when the project ended, 
Ethiopia has embarked on further reform as change rather than consolidating the new 
plateaus established over twelve years of reform (reform as sustain). The current reform 
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35 Perhaps the most pressing PFM issue in Ethiopia is the performance of reporting from 
weredas and regions. The performance/program budgeting initiative for federal public bodies 
does not address this issue and indeed, distracts MOFED from devoting attention to the 
reporting issues and supporting the wereda plateaus.    32 
is focused on summiting from the federal level. While the rating of having the third best 
PFM system in Africa is deserved, the regional and sub-regional (wereda) plateaus are 
under severe stress. Turnover of finance staffs in weredas ranges between thirty and 
sixty percent per annum, and delays are emerging in reporting on critical donor/lender 
programs. Instead of addressing the constraints to executing the existing plateaus, the 
government is focused on summiting from the center. The climbing agenda is not 
modest and would tax even the most developed countries as Ethiopia is now climbing 
four of the highest PFM peaks: performance/program budgeting, modified/accrual 
accounting, an Oracle IFMIS, and a medium term expenditure framework. 
RETHINKING PFM REFORM IN AFRICA 
Reform of PFM in Africa has lost its way. Richard Allen points to the fault of 
too much technique and not being in touch—understanding the realities on the ground. 
The fundamental problem however, is that many PFM reforms do not address the hard 
questions—sustainability and quality of expenditure.  
PFM reform in Africa has been much about summits and not about plateaus. 
What often drives summiting is foreign aid specifically, using PFM summits as 
conditionality’s and or supporting the business model of donor/lender technical 
assistance departments. Tying a long-term reform to the timescales of short-term 
disbursement is imprudent and destined to fail. The Ethiopian reform took twelve years 
to build up a financial plateau that had inefficient control to one of effective control of 
international standards. Reforming financial management of any country takes years but 
there seems to be a school of thought and unfortunately practice, that if one just gets the 
sequence of techniques right, summits can be done quickly and risk can be managed.
36  
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36 Perhaps the zenith of metric mining in PFM has been reached with the proposal to use PEFAs 
to define reform sequences. Ronald Quist has argued for a ‘Sequencing Rating Indicator (SRI)’   33 
PFM reforms in Africa, and on other continents have lost their way because they 
have forgotten the guides. Aaron Wildavsky’s ‘A Budget for all Seasons: Why the 
Traditional Budget Lasts’ along with ‘If Policy is Everything, Maybe its Nothing,’ 
needs to be reread or I suspect, read for the first time by those funding and directing 
PFM reforms (Wildavsky, 1978; Wildavsky, 1973).
37 His message is clear, timeless, 
and certainly on target for Africa. He argues that budgets, and PFM writ large, must be 
robust and while they may not reach perfection on any metric, they must not fail on any 
metric. Second best in all categories is best practice, international or otherwise. He 
argues that while second best may be traditional, it is not sclerotic and it provides a 
bedrock for sophistication in administration and analysis. For Aaron, and hopefully 
most budget directors, little concern would be raised if a performance target went 
missing while much concern would be raised if cash did. Aaron’s work illustrated a 
point that seems to be lost in current PFM thinking—that public financial management 
is significantly different than private sector management and the latter can adopt 
sophisticated techniques because its task is far simpler.  
Aaron’s work directly addressed the heart of public finance—risk. Risk is the 
gravity of public financial management. It is always there, difficult to measure, but 
ignored at one’s peril. Risk is the core of financial management for both the public and 
private sectors (Peterson, 2010).
38 The crisis of our age is the mismanagement of 
financial risk within and between these sectors. A country’s PFM system is the 
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based on a 74 by 74 matrix of PEFA sub-indicators that can be expressed in an equation. 
Defining a country’s PFM reform sequence can then be ‘conveniently and instantaneously’ 
calculated by plugging the PEFA scores and sub-matrix into the SRI equation. See Quist (2009, 
p. 9).   
37 Reformers and their patrons could also profit by also reviewing Wildavsky (1979) on how 
specialists can speak to senior government policy makers responsible for PFM reform.   
38 The crisis of our age is the result of the global LIE: leverage that is unfathomable, institutions 
that are discredited, and, experts who are uncertain about the uncertainty (Peterson, 2010, p. 
vii).    34 
instrument for managing financial risk and should never be at risk (second best is better 
than first).
39 The focus on financial summits not plateaus in Africa has not worked and 
has caused considerable harm. The Ethiopian experience shows a pathway of reform 
that built plateaus and managed risk. It also reaffirms that there are no shortcuts to 
progress in Africa (or elsewhere) (Hyden, 1983). 
Why hasn’t one, if not the most successful PFM reforms of the past decade in 
sub-Saharan Africa, in the second most populous country, been studied? The reason 
may lie between the exclusion of the government of the Bretton Woods from the 
reform—it wasn’t their show--and the reform’s unorthodox focus on plateaus not 
summits. Hopefully for students, but especially practitioners, this article starts to 
address this oversight and provides a new landscape for understanding and guiding 
PFM reforms in Africa and other developing countries.  
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
39 The traditional budget is robust because it is the best budgetary technique for managing risk—
it is a minimax solution—it minimizes the maximum loss.    35 
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